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AFIT/GCA/ENV/09-M01 
Abstract 
 
The purpose of this research was to evaluate the 60 year old military 
medical retirement system.  Specifically, this thesis answered three research 
questions regarding a comparison of pay between the current system and the 
societal standard for injury and illness, identification of current segments of the 
military population disproportionately affected by the current system, and 
establishment of a minimal standard for medical retirement compensation.  
Previous research established the societal standard for compensation as the 
Value of Statistical Life.  This thesis compared the current military medical 
retirement system with the Value of Statistical Life and identified several 
segments of the military medical retiree population that were adversely affected 
by the current system.  Further, this thesis proposed a new method for 
calculating medical retirement pay incorporating the societal standard for injury 
and illness. 
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ANALYSIS OF THE MILITARY MEDICAL RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
 
I. Introduction 
Background 
  
Over the past 60 years, the military has dealt with the issue of compensating 
its disabled service-members based on five motivating guides (DoD Actuary 
2007: B-2):   
1. Continued service in the armed forces is competitive with the alternatives 
2. Promotion opportunities are kept open for young and able members 
3. Some measure of economic security is made available to members after 
retirement from a military career  
4. A pool of experienced personnel is available for recall in times of war or 
national emergency 
5. The costs of the system are reasonable. 
Two of these motivating guides resonated with us: “economic security” and 
“reasonable costs.”  We wanted to evaluatethe current military medical retirement 
system, as this is a subset of the entire military retirement system, to see if the 
compensation tracks with the motivating guides.  But in order to understand the 
current military medical retirement system we must first examine how the military 
medical retirement system came about. 
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History of the Military Medical Retirement System 
  
“The pilgrims at Plymouth provided in 1636 that any man sent forth as a 
soldier and returned maimed should be maintained by the colony during his life” 
(DoD Actuary: B-2).  In 1776 the States adopted the Plymouth policy for the 
Revolutionary War and compensated any disabled military members with half-
pay for life or throughout the life-cycle of the disability.  Post-war compensation 
for disabled veterans went through a couple of changes culminating, in 1832, 
with full-pay for life for the service-member.  Compensation to widows was added 
in 1836 (DoD Actuary: B-2).  After the Civil War Congress instituted a fix on 
retirement pay to be 75 percent of pay to include those retired by disability.  
During World War I retirement pay was once again changed to two and a half 
percent of pay per years in service (DoD Actuary: B-3).   
After World War II the disability retirement system was plagued with problems 
forcing Congress to pass the Career Compensation Act of 1949.  “Under this 
system, all disabilities had to be rated under the standard schedule of rating 
disabilities in use by the Veterans Administration, and the resulting ratings 
became a factor in disability retired pay entitlement and taxability” (DoD Actuary: 
B-4).  Since 1949 the disability retirement system has remained fundamentally 
the same where compensation is based on the higher of:   
1. Years of service x 2.5 x base pay--high 3 average as applicable or 
2. Percentage of disability x high 3 average. 
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Service-members entering the military before September 7, 1980 base final pay 
on the highest pay received, and those entering after base final pay as the 
average of the last 36 months of service. 
Each military service branch has its own unique disability evaluation 
process.  For the Air Force, the Secretary of the Air Force through the Chief, 
USAF Physical Disability Division HQ AFPC/DPSD performs Medical Evaluation 
Boards (MEB) and Physical Evaluation Boards (PEB) in order to determine 
fitness for duty of disabled airmen.  The MEB, located at the service-members 
military treatment facility, evaluates each airman to determine fitness for duty.  
The PEB reviews the cases of airmen deemed to be unfit for duty by the MEB, 
and the PEB can either concur with the MEB’s determination or find the airman fit 
for duty.  If the PEB concurs with the MEB the PEB assigns a disability rating 
ranging from 10-100 percent increasing by increments of 10.  Airmen with less 
than 20 years of service and who have a disability rating of 10 or 20 percent are 
given a one-time severance payment and those with a disability rating of 30 
percent or higher are medically retired from the service.   
Motivation for Research 
 
 We wanted to revisit the military medical retirement system to verify the 60 
year old system still ensures “economic security.”  Our focus is not the disability 
rating given to a service-member.  In order to verify “economic security” we must 
understand the purpose behind the Veteran’s Affairs Schedule for Rating 
Disabilities (VASRD). 
4 
 
According to 38 Code of Federal Regulation (CFR) Section 4.1, the 
governing regulation behind military disability compensation, “the percentage 
ratings [VASRD] represent as far as can practicably be determined the average 
impairment in earning capacity resulting from such diseases and injuries and 
their residual conditions in civil occupations.”  However, our research examines if 
“impairment of earnings capacity” is the best way to value “economic security”, or 
should the military medical disability retirement compensation be based on the 
value of the injury or illness.  The value of an injury or illness is “the implicit value 
of life that society has determined” (Smith 2000: 170).  Which measure of 
calculating compensation is more equitable?  Here we define equitable as the 
“societal standard for government agencies in their consideration of the costs 
and benefits of life and injury-saving regulations” (Smith 2000:169).  “Over the 
past three decades, a broad body of economic research has been published on 
estimates of the value of an anonymous human life” (Smith 2000:169).  These 
estimates are referred to as the value of statistical life, hereafter known as (VSL). 
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as well as the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) calculate VSLs as part of cost-benefit 
analyses for the purpose of evaluating life-saving legislation (OMB 2003: 29, 
EPA 1990: I-3).  As a part of litigation economists testify as expert witnesses 
about the VSL and to determine “reasonable” behavior by corporations (Smith 
2000: 170).  We know the United States government accepts and use of VSL as 
the societal standard for consideration of costs.  Therefore, we are able to use 
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VSL as an acceptable method of evaluating current disability compensation.  
This leads us to the following research questions. 
Research Questions 
 
1. Is the net present value for military medical retirement payments 
equivalent to the societal standard of the implicit value of statistical life? 
2. Are certain segments of the Air Force population disproportionately 
affected by the current military medical retirement system? 
3. What is the minimum standard for military medical retirement 
compensation? 
Summary of Results 
We found the net present value of payments under the current military 
medical retirement system are not on par with societal standards for the value of 
illness or injury at all ranks and disability ratings.  Junior enlisted with few years 
of service, senior enlisted, and senior officers are compensated far less under 
the current system compared with the societal standard. 
The current military medical retirement system places junior enlisted with 
less than four years of service under the poverty threshold for the United States.  
More than half of the highly disabled, 80-100 percent, do not participate in the 
labor force after retirement (Buddin 2005: 48); therefore, junior enlisted with few 
years of service may not be able to escape poverty for their entire lifespan. 
Society has developed standards that are deemed equitable for injuries or 
illness.  Our VSL model accounts for this equity and should be used as the 
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minimum standard for military medical retirement compensation.  In the next 
chapter we discuss why the VSL model is the best approach for valuing 
compensation, and we discuss the previous literature that has been published on 
this topic.   
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II.  Literature Review 
Introduction  
 
In 2005, RAND National Defense Research Institute published a report 
entitled “An Analysis of Military Disability Compensation.”  In this report Richard 
Buddin and Kanika Kapur researched the “current policies for compensating 
veterans with service-connected disabilities” (Buddin 2005).  They compared the 
current military disability retirement system to systems used by civilian firms.  As 
part of their findings they noted: 
The military retirement system has become unduly complex…a more 
coherent system is needed that identifies the criterion for measuring 
economic loss from an injury.  Should it be civilian earnings, quality of life, 
or some other criterion?”  (Buddin 2005: 88). 
Our research adds to their findings as we propose the VSL model meets the 
requirement for measuring economic loss. In the next section we deconstruct the 
VSL model to understand how it was developed, and why it is a measure of 
society’s value for injury or illness. 
The Approaches to Calculate the Value of Statistical Life 
 
The three approaches to the valuation of statistical life are willingness-to-
accept, willingness-to-pay, and contingent valuation.  “The willingness-to-accept 
approach consists of determining the minimum amount that a person is willing to 
be paid to be exposed to an incremental increase in the risk of death” (Smith 
2000: 170).  Willingness-to-accept (WTA) studies typically assess risk tolerance 
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for different occupations.  Willingness-to-pay (WTP) studies examine how much 
an individual is willing to pay in order to decrease their risk of death.  Contingent 
valuation studies blend willingness-to-accept and willingness-to-pay approaches 
through surveys of individuals (Smith 2000:170).   
The current trend in economic literature prefers to use the willingness-to-
pay approach to value statistical life.  This trend is based on the limitation that the 
WTA approach lacks a budgetary constraint, while the WTP approach is bound 
by the limits of one’s budget (EPA 1990: I-1).  WTP is further distinguished into 
two separate methodologies.  The first being the “revealed-preference” approach 
which is based on market data (Lanoie, Pedro, and Latour 1995: 235).  The 
second approach is the “contingent-valuation” approach which is based on 
surveys (Lanoie et al 1995: 235).  “A willingness-to-pay estimate values the 
change in well-being that would result from changing the risk of death; it is 
measured by how much wealth a person is willing to forgo to obtain that 
reduction in the risk of death” (Lanoie et al 1995: 236).  The summation of each 
person’s WTP is the overall value of statistical life.   
The “revealed-preference” approach makes use of market behavior 
information involving the wealth and risk tradeoff.  The most common way to 
obtain this information is through “wage-risk studies” which calculate a wage 
premium for increased risk of death for a particular job via regression analysis 
(Lanoie et al 1995: 237).  Consumer-market studies are a second form of the 
“revealed-preference” approach.  These studies focus on daily consumption 
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decisions for such safety items as smoke detectors or fire extinguishers and their 
relative expenditure versus risk tradeoff. 
Using “contingent-valuation”, researchers survey individuals using tailored 
questionnaires in an effort to find their behavior in differing risk situations.  This 
allows for greater generalization across populations which in turn increase 
external validity or the ability for research to “hold for other persons in other 
places and at other times” (Trochim 2008: 34).  However, this approach is based 
off of hypothetical situations that individuals may never have experienced; 
therefore, their actual behavior may differ from their response behavior.   
In their 1995 study, Lanoie et al attempted to compare willingness-to-pay 
to willingness-to-accept.  In order to compare the two methods, a study was 
conducted on 16 firms with 100 or more workers located in the greater Montreal 
region.  The researchers interviewed 200 participants and each participant was 
interviewed for approximately one half hour.  Respondents ranked the risk of 
accidental job-related death via a given scale, and the respondents circled their 
job’s associated risk.  The interviewer then asked what they need to be paid in 
order to remain in the same job, but the risk of death would be increased one 
step further on the risk scale (WTA).  The next question asked how much of a 
decrease in wage would they would forgo in order to stay in the same job but be 
one step lower on the risk scale (WTP).  The findings, consistent with previous 
literature, indicated individuals “generally require far more compensation to give 
up a good than they are willing to pay to acquire it” (Lanoie et al 1995: 243).  
Psychologists refer to this theory as loss aversion.  A third question asked the 
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respondents to value the installation of air-bags in their car (revealed-preference 
approach).  “The results showed that the value of a statistical life obtained from 
both methods [contingent-valuation and revealed-preference] were relatively high 
as compared with the rest of the literature” (Lanoie et al 1995: 254).  The authors 
theorized this high value was due to problems individuals have with valuing low 
probability events. 
The VSL estimates from previous literature are further detailed in section 
four.  We will now look into how major oversight bodies utilize VSL figures in 
section three. 
Utilization of VSL Estimates by Oversight Bodies 
 
The government uses VSL estimates to assess the value of programs or 
regulations; courts have also deemed it appropriate to offer economist’s expert 
VSL testimony to determine equitable compensation for victims in tort litigation.  
The difficult question government officials must determine for government 
programs is how safe is safe enough?  “Many public projects impose costs on 
society in exchange for reducing the risk of death.  To determine whether a 
project is socially desirable, one has to compare the value of reducing risks to the 
costs of such reductions” (Lanoie et al 1995: 235).  ”Risk reduction involves cost 
and this means that a monetary valuation of human life is unavoidable” (Rackwitz 
2005: 469).  However, “people often respond to risk in a seemingly irrational 
way—at least from the viewpoint of experts” (Rackwitz 2005: 470).  This 
“irrational” thinking is attributed to cognitive limitations of people (Slovic, 
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Fischhoff and Lichtenstein 1977: 12).  The question in risk mitigation is how 
much society is willing to pay to reduce an accident or death by some sort of 
policy or program (Rackwitz 2005: 470). 
In order to execute a cost-benefit analysis for the health benefits 
associated with cleaner air, one must compute the VSL.  The VSL estimate is 
employed by the government and industry through cost-benefit analyses to 
determine what can be deemed “reasonable behavior.”  Reasonable behavior is 
the societal standard which determines levels of safety for both government and 
industry within plants and products (Smith 2000: 169).  “Optimization of technical 
facilities involving risks for human life and limb require an acceptability criterion 
and suitable discount rates both for the public and the operator depending on for 
whom the optimization is carried out” (Rackwitz 2005: 469).  Reasonable levels 
for discount and optimization of VSL estimates aredirected by the OMB.  The 
OMB recognized that federal agencies differed in their valuation methods and on 
January 11, 1996, Executive Order 12866 (Economic Analysis of Federal 
Regulations) directed: 
One acceptable explicit valuation approach would be for the agency to 
select a single estimate of the value of reductions in fatality risk at 
ordinarily encountered risk levels, or a distribution of such values, and use 
these values consistently for evaluating all its programs that affect 
ordinary fatality risks. 
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No explicit value has been determined to be the true VSL, but the OMB has 
determined for purposes of government programs to use a range of values from 
$1 million to $10 million. 
 Economists developed the value per statistical life year (VSLY) in order to 
calculate values in terms of years rather than lives.  “Some economists have 
argued that the value of a statistical life should be converted to a value of per 
statistical life year (VSLY), and that lives saved should be valued by multiplying 
remaining life expectancy by the VSLY” (Alberini, Cropper, Krupnick, and Simon 
2003: 770).  The theory behind the VSLY is that each year of life is equally 
valued and does not vary with health and age.  The counterargument is 
chronically ill individuals should be willing to pay less for risk reduction compared 
to their healthy counterparts.  “This argument has been used to assign lower 
VSLs to beneficiaries of air pollution control programs than [those] currently used 
by USEPA” (Alberini et al 2003).  However, Alberni et al found no support for a 
decline in the WTP from individuals suffering chronic illness, and only weak 
evidence supporting a lower WTP in people over 70. 
 The EPA looked into the relationship of air pollution and premature deaths 
as part of the Clean Air Act of 1990.  Appendix I of the Clean Air Act of 1990 
explains the procedure the EPA undertakes for mortality valuations due to air 
pollution.  The procedure entails a cost-benefit analysis based on the VSL.  The 
EPA noticed deaths in cases of exposure to hazardous air were more prevalent 
in people over the age of 64.  Still within the Clean Air Act of 1990, the EPA 
reported a cost-benefit study regarding sulfate exposure related deaths where 
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the VSL was estimated at 75 percent of the value of middle-aged individuals.  
Although the EPA had empirical evidence supported by prior research, the Office 
of Management and Budget ordered the EPA to discontinue use of different 
values for older individuals in a memorandum dated May 30, 2003.   
 We have discussed how government agencies utilize VSL estimates as 
part of their oversight.  We briefly explained how the VSL is calculated.  The next 
section will further expound on how the VSL is derived from economic theory as 
well as discuss previous VSL estimates that have been published. 
VSL Calculation 
 
“The VSL is equal to the monetary value of the individual’s expected 
present value utility” (Johansson 2000:138).  In order to find the present value of 
an individual’s utility we must determine an appropriate rate of discount.  
According to the OMB, “regulations should report net present value and other 
outcomes determined using a real discount rate of 7 percent” (1992: 8).  
However, economic literature is inconsistent with that of the OMB.  “The interest 
rates should be close to the long-term economic growth rate per capita as this is 
the rate with which a member of the public becomes wealthier” (Rackwitz 
2005:477).  Economists have called this long-term rate the natural interest rate.  
Rackwitz proposed the average yearly growth of a country’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita over a long-term time horizon is the best measure of 
quality-of-life gains for the country.  The United States’ economic growth, 
measured by GDP, per year has averaged approximately 1.8 percent since 1928 
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(Rackwitz 2005: 476).  Utilizing willingness-to-pay approach, he valued a 
statistical life in the United States to be 3.3 million dollars per person. 
In his 2005 article Louis Kaplow stated: 
“An important strand of this literature measures the value of a statistical 
life (VSL) based on individuals’ tradeoff between wages or prices on one 
hand and job or product safety on the other.  Researchers have long 
recognized that VSL depends positively on income” (24). 
In order to compute a meaningful VSL it is important to understand how risk and 
income can affect the VSL.  Kaplow studied the relationship between income 
elasticity of the VSL and relative risk aversion.  He noticed, “VSL depends (in 
significant part) on the marginal utility cost of expenditures to protect one’s life” 
(2005: 24).  One theory suggests that as income doubled an individual would pay 
twice as much for a given safety measure (Kaplow 2005: 25).  However, a 
second effect on the VSL exists because “preserving one’s life is higher when 
income is higher, because utility is accordingly higher” (Kaplow 2005: 25).  The 
two components of the income elasticity of VSL are as follows: 
,   (1)   
where, 
 x is expenditures 
p(x) is the probability of death,  
y is income, and  
u is the concave function of consumption.   
And for an individual we have the following: 
15 
 
      (2)   
where u’ is the derivative of u with respect to consumption.  we can see the VSL 
is given:  
    (3)   
where  
u is the utility benefit of saving one’s life, and  
(1-p)u’ is the expected marginal cost (in units of utility per dollar), to give 
the value of statistical life (VSL) in dollars.   
Both u and VSL depend on consumption c.  If ŋ is the elasticity of VSL with 
respect to c, then, 
     (4)   
and we find, 
   (5)   
where  
xc = dx/dc  
and xc shows how a person’s x of p(x) moves in relation to c increasing.  When 
equations are combined we see: 
  (6)   
Substituting p’ using the first order condition the equation can be simplified to  
   (7)   
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The first part of the equation is the elasticity of u with respect to c, or ŋuc.  The 
second part of the equation is the relative risk aversion R.  When substituted into 
the above equation we get 
   (8)   
where 
  is the elasticity of VSL, the utility of saving one’s life is indicated by uc, 
1-xc is the weighted effect due to expenditures of safety when income increases, 
and R is the marginal utility consumption with respect to consumption.  See 
Kaplow (2005:26-7) for a more in depth explanation.  As is evident from the 
equation when income increases, thereby increasing consumption, utility value of 
saving one’s life also rises.  Also, as income increases the cost of safety 
expenditures falls at the rate of R. 
Now that we understand how the VSL is derived we can look into previous 
estimates of the VSL.  Figure 2.1 shows a summary of 37 VSL estimates ranging 
in values of $0.1 million to $16.2 million with a mean of $5.1 million and a 
standard deviation of $4.7 million.  This mean falls directly in line with the OMB’s 
VSL range of $1 million to $10 million.  We previously touched on how age plays 
a factor in the computation of the VSL.  This next section will further delve into 
how age and risk affect the VSL. 
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Figure 1.  Summary of VSL Estimates (Viscusi 1993:16-7, 22-3, & 26) 
 
Worker’s Age Variation and the VSL 
 
In 2003 the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) conducted an 
analysis which included a “senior discount.”  This discount created a separate 
value for statistical life for individuals over 70 which was 63 percent of the value 
of under 70 (Aldy and Viscusi 2004).  This separate VSL was soon dropped due 
to political pressures.  The thought process behind why older people would have 
a lower VSL is based on the assumption that because life expectancy is lower 
older people would not be willing to pay as much for risk reduction.  Under this 
philosophy the highest VSL would be at birth. 
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In order to add to previous literature involving job risk variation by age 
Aldy and Viscusi (2004) added an age variable to the worker’s industry which 
had not been accomplished previously.  The Bureau of Labor and Statistics 
(BLS) and Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) recently developed a 
database tracking every job-related fatality, and this database was utilized by 
Aldy and Viscusi to be able to track age and type of industry for each fatal 
accident.  “Injury and mortality risks are not constant across a worker’s life cycle, 
making the age adjustment in the risk variables potentially important” (Aldy and 
Viscusi 2004: 13).  Younger workers have a higher frequency of injury than older 
workers, but this might be due to younger workers are subject to riskier jobs than 
their more senior coworkers.  Older workers tend to be in management which 
lowers their job risk.  In contrast, Aldy and Viscusi (2004: 15) find that older 
workers have higher fatality rates than their younger counterparts.  The fatality 
rates for older workers are not based on job riskiness but on fragility.  Older 
workers tend to suffer more serious injuries at a given level of risk.  “The age-
specific divergence in injury and mortality risks…facilitate[s] the estimation of 
wage premiums for both fatal and non-fatal risks” (Aldy and Viscusi 2004: 15). 
To show empirically the age-VSL relationship Aldy and Viscusi used a 
standard hedonic wage regression: 
Ln(wi) = α + Hi’β + γ1pi + γ2qi +γ3qiWCi + εi  (9)   
where 
 wi is the worker i’s hourly after-tax wage rate, 
 α is a constant term, 
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 H is a vector of personal characteristic variables for worker I, 
 pi is the fatality risk associated with worker i’s job, 
 qi is the nonfatal injury risk associated with worker i’s job, 
WCi is the workers’ compensation replacement rate payable for a job 
injury suffered by worker i, and 
εi is the random error reflecting unmeasured factors influencing i’s wage 
rate. 
Their assumption was a 2,000-hour work year.  With α = .01 the results of the 
equation were statistically significant with a sample mean VSL of $4.23 million 
(1996$).  A 95 percent confidence interval had a range of values from $3.20 
million to $5.28 million (1996$).  The upper boundary for our VSL model is 
consistent with the values calculated by Aldy and Viscusi; however, our lower 
bound value of life was set to the OMB minimum in order to show the very lowest 
boundary for comparison purposes. 
Aldy and Viscusi then expanded their results with: 1. separate age group 
subsample hedonic wage regressions, 2. a minimum distance estimator based 
on a series of age-specific hedonic wage regressions in the first stage, 3. a 
hedonic wage regression with the interaction of mortality risk and age, and 4. 
hedonic wage regressions evaluating the effects of life-cycle events on the age-
VSL profile.  The results of each of the further tests found an age-VSL 
relationship of an inverted-U.  Aldy and Viscusi (2004) calculated the VSL similar 
to the methodology used by Kaplow (2005).  However, Aldy and Viscusi added a 
time factor to the equation: 
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     (10)   
where,  
 wp is the VSL 
 u is the utility given by consumption at time t 
  is the probability at time t to live to . 
  is the marginal utility 
The added time factor enables us to calculate value of statistical life years 
(VSLY) as well as the VSL.  Values of life are lower in the beginning of life rising 
to a peak near the late 30s to early 40s and then decreases.  The hedonic wage 
regression evaluating the effects of life-cycle events on the age-VSL profile 
showed no change in the VSL for married individuals or people with school age 
children.   
Figure 2.2 is a graphical depiction of the what they referred to as an 
inverted-U effect of age on VSLY.  The VSLY is the value of life for each 
continued year of life.  It can be computed as follows: 
    (11)   
where,  
 r is the discount rate, and 
 L is years of expected life. 
As the age of the worker increases from youth we see the VSLYs increase and 
plateau around in the worker’s late 30s before the value decreases.  We found 
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the yearly cash-flows paid to disabled veterans followed a similar pattern as 
Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  Value of Statistical Life Years (Aldy and Viscusi 2004: 47-8) 
 
Ex Post Confirmation 
 
In his 2000 study, Stan Smith observed previous studies regarding the 
VSL used ex ante data as “they estimate the value of life prior to [a] life-
threatening event.”  Smith’s argument was to value life using ex post data, after a 
traumatic event.  By using ex post data he was able to determine compensations 
for actual injuries or fatalities.  Smith hypothesized the VSL from previous ex ante 
literature was consistent with his ex post data for 340 jury awards in non-fatal car 
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crashes throughout the United States.  The model to test his theory was 
constructed as follows: 
A = I + XΛ + ΘPVIMP + M    (12)   
where 
 A is the award given by jury verdict 
 I is the intercept 
X is a vector of demographic information of the plaintiffs 
 Θ is the coefficient of the ordinary least square regression (OLS) 
 PVIMP is the present value of impairment  
 M is the error associated with the OLS regression line 
PVIMP is the percentage of impairment due to the crash ranging from 0 to 1 on a 
continuous scale where 0 is no impairment and 1 is total impairment. Our 
measure of disability, VASRD, is much like the PVIMP with the exception that the 
VASRD is discreet and not continuous.  Physicians evaluated the seven 
dimensions in order to create the overall ranking for PVIMP.  The results of the 
regression model showed statistically significant for PVIMP at the 99% 
confidence interval for the logged model.  The value of Θ, $2.3 million, was 
consistent with that of ex ante literature as well within the OMB VSL range, 
thereby accepting Smith’s hypothesis.   
 The confirmation by the ex post data shows juries routinely value life at 
the same values calculated by experts.  And because both the ex ante and ex 
post literature agree we have reasonable confirmation that the estimates properly 
determine an acceptable societal standard.  Having an acceptable societal 
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standard gives us the ability to properly value public work projects.  Smith’s 
calculated value of life is the upper boundary for our VSL model adjusted for 
inflation. 
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III.  Methodology 
Procedure for Data Analysis 
  
We compared the net present value (NPV) of the current military medical 
retirement system with the NPV of the alternative VSL model in order to see if the 
current system is equitable.  Remember, we defined equitable as the “societal 
standard for government agencies in their consideration of the costs and benefits 
of life and injury-saving regulations” (Smith 2000:169).   
 NPV is calculated by the equation: 
 
where 
 NPV = net present value 
 CF = cash flow 
 t = period in which the cash flow occurs 
 I = interest rate 
 n = final period of payment 
In both models, the current system and VSL, n represents the service-members 
mortality, given by the mortality tables published annually by the DoD Office of 
the Actuary.  We specified our periods to be annual for ease of comparison. 
The same discounting interest rate was used for both models.  No variation in 
interest rate changed our analysis.  The only difference between the current 
medical disability retirement system and the proposed VSL model lies with the 
computation of the cash flows.  Here, we delve into the method for computing 
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cash flows for each model.  We recall the current system calculates cash flows 
as is the higher of: 
1. Years of Service x 2.5 x Base Pay, or  
2. Disability Rating x Base Pay.   
Data for the years of service, disability rating, and the gross compensation are 
collected and published by the DoD Office of the Actuary 
The VSL model calculates cash flows as Disability Rating x VSL.  We 
utilized the same disability rating for both the current system and the VSL model.  
The next step was determining an appropriate value for the VSL.  As we 
determined from chapter 2 the VSL is not a constant number, but rather a range.  
As discovered by Lanoie et al 1995, the VSL varies with experience and 
supervisory responsibilities; therefore, our value for the VSL varies with rank 
equal to the variation in retirement pay and rank.  Figure 3 represents the 
appropriate value for VSL depending on rank at time of medical retirement.   
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Figure 3.  How the VSL Varies by Rank 
The value for VSL can range from one million dollars for an individual 
ranked E-1 to a max value of 3,113,942 dollars for an O-6.  The minimum value 
for VSL represents the lower bound value dictated by OMB, and the maximum 
value for VSL represents the inflation adjusted value of life calculated by Smith, 
2000.  The VSL for an individual case is calculated by referencing the 
appropriate High 3 retirement pay and interpolating the position on the line 
between the lower and upper bounds to the VSL.  The appropriate VSL is then 
multiplied by the disability rating to determine the NPV for each medically retired 
service-member.  As part of our calculations we made a few assumptions.  
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Assumptions 
 
1. Cash flows for both models are adjusted annually for inflation.  These 
cost-of-living adjustments are based on the consumer price index (CPI) 
which is a measure of inflation published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.  
The discount rate in NPV is based on inflation which is also represented 
by the CPI; therefore, the cash flows are increased each subsequent 
period by the same rate that each cash flow is discounted. 
2. Retirement pay calculations are based on the high-3 calculation or the 
average pay over the last 36 months of service since all service-members 
who could be medically retired have less than 20 years of service and 
entered active duty after September 7, 1980. 
3. For forecasting purposes the rank at retirement is based off the average 
time in service for promotion.   
4. The final cash flow when the veteran expires is for a full period. 
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Data 
  
Annually, the Department of Defense Office of the Actuary publishes the 
Department of Defense Statistical Report on the Military Retirement System 
which details the number of disabled retirees as well as the compensation 
associated with each retiree.  Our analysis is based on data from the DoD Office 
of the Actuary for the years 2001-2007.   
We utilized the United States Census Bureau’s poverty threshold to 
determine if the cash flows received by medically retired service-members would 
place the service-member below the poverty line.  The threshold for being in 
poverty varies depending on the size of the family including the number of 
children and if there is a spouse.  The Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) 
publishes data on the average number of dependents per service-member.  
According to AFPC the average number of dependents is approximately 1.25.  
Once we had the average number of dependents we were able to calculate the 
average poverty threshold for service-members, and that value is 16,689 dollars 
per year. 
We also utilized AFPC’s personnel statistics for determining the average 
time of service for promotions as well as the average High-3 retirement pay.  We 
needed this data in order calculate cash flows for the current medical retirement 
system. 
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IV.  Analysis 
 
Table 1 details the number of newly disabled veterans in 2007 as well as 
the number of all disabled veterans broken out by disability rating. 
Table 1 Disabled Veterans by Percent Disabled 
Newly Disabled in 2007  Total Disabled Veterans 
 All Department of Defense   All Department of Defense 
Disability 
Percent 
Officer Enlisted Total  Disability 
Percent 
Officer Enlisted Total 
10 12 53 65  10 1,002 4,656 5,658 
20 7 63 70  20 1,091 3,381 4,472 
30 134 1,640 1,774  30 4,467 23,062 27,529 
40 73 772 845  40 2,802 10,855 13,657 
50 49 290 339  50 1,618 5,281 6,899 
60 28 216 244  60 2,017 5,212 7,229 
70 17 71 88  70 967 2,005 2,972 
80 5 40 45  75 130 96 226 
90 3 18 21  80 719 1,085 1,804 
100 33 181 214  90 234 241 475 
UNK 5 20 25  100 1,281 2,542 3,823 
TOTAL 366 3,364 3,730  UNK 3,641 6,921 10,562 
     TOTAL 19,969 65,337 85,306 
Source: Department of Defense Office of the Actuary 2007: 194 
 
 The 85,000 service members across the Department of Defense who 
receive disability retirement pay is approximately nine percent of the total number 
of retirees and their annual compensation equates to $1.29 billion or less than 
four percent of all retirees compensation. 
 During 2001-2007, an average of 2,722 military members were medically 
retired from service annually--89 percent enlisted, 11 percent officers.  Figure 4 
shows the average number of service-members medically retired each year by 
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branch of service and disability rating.  The Army represents the largest 
percentage, 44 percent, of service-members who were medically retired. 
 
Figure 4.  Average Number of Medically Retired Members by Rating 2001-
2007 
 
Examining Figure 4, we notice each service has the highest number of 
disability retirees rated at 30 percent.  In order to compare the service branches, 
we decided to normalize the data by looking at the number of service-members 
medically retired from each service branch as a percentage. Figures 5 and 6 
represent the number of medically retired service-members for each branch as a 
percentage of the total number of medically retired from each branch.  We notice 
all the service branches follow a similar pattern when rating service-members 
disabilities with the exception that the Air Force routinely rates service-members 
at 50 percent disability over two times as often as the other services.  We 
conducted a T-test on the 50 percent disability rating between the four service 
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branches over the years 2001 through 2007 giving us eight observations for each 
service.  Our alpha was .05 and the critical T value for the test was 2.3.  Our 
resulting T-stat of -3.9 showed a statistically significant difference between the 
ratings of Air Force and other branches of service.  
 
Figure 5.  Disability Rating by Percentage of Total Force Disabled 2001-2007 
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Figure 6.  Disability Rating by Percentage of Total Force Disabled—All Living 
Medically Retired 
 
 When we broke out the total force into officers and enlisted we noticed the 
services followed similar rating patterns; however, officers were routinely rated at 
a higher disability than enlisted.  Seventy-five percent of officers have a disability 
rating of 50 or below, but 86 percent of enlisted have a disability rating of 50 or 
below. Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the disparity between officer and enlisted 
disability ratings.   
 
Figure 7.  Enlisted Disability Rating by Percentage of Enlisted Disabled 
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Figure 8.  Officer Disability Rating by Percentage of Officers Disabled 
We conducted a T-test between the disability ratings between officers and 
enlisted.  The critical T for our test was 1.38 and our T-statistic was -1.7.  The 
difference in disability ratings between officers and enlisted was determined to be 
statistically significant different with an alpha = .10.    
Inconsistency exists between the disability ratings of officers and enlisted; 
however, this inconsistency did not answer our research question of whether or 
not a certain segment of service-members are disproportionately affected by the 
current system.  In order to answer the research question, we calculated the 
retirement pay for service-members based on rank and years of service.  Each 
service-member has a distinct calculation for base retirement pay; however, we 
are able to make the assumption of the most likely final pay based on average 
promotion times.  Appendix A contains all of our calculations for each most likely 
final pay based on years of service, rank, and disability rating; moreover, the 
calculations consider the larger of two options for the current disability retirement 
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system.  Table 2 displays final pay for service-members rated 80 percent 
disabled which represent a service-member who had part of his or her skull 
removed due to a brain hernia. 
Table 2. Final Pay Per Rank & Years of Service at 80% Disability 
 
Pay Grade  Over 2   Over 3   Over 4   Over 6   Over 8  
O-3                     -                      -       39,101.76     46,062.72     48,303.36  
O-2      28,142.40     32,485.44     37,262.40     40,094.40     40,639.68  
O-1      25,837.44     28,030.08     30,222.72     32,068.80     32,068.80  
O-3E                     -                      -                      -                      -       43,724.16  
O-2E                     -                      -                      -       34,925.76     41,071.68  
O-1E                     -                      -       24,630.72     32,795.52                    -    
E-5                     -                      -                      -       22,276.80     24,540.48  
E-4      16,445.76     17,905.92     19,435.20     20,715.84     21,297.60  
E-3      15,910.08     16,841.28     17,513.28                    -                      -    
E-2      14,518.08     15,059.52                    -                      -                      -    
E-1      13,435.20                    -                      -                      -                      -    
 
The red shaded areas represent service-members whose disability retirement 
pay would place them below the poverty threshold, and the yellow shaded areas 
represent pay that is within ten percent of the poverty threshold.  According to 
Buddin and Kapur’s 2005 study (Page 48) a disability rating of 80 percent 
decreases after retirement labor force participation rate to 41 percent.  Without 
additional gainful employment medically retired junior enlisted members with few 
years of service can receive pay lower than the poverty threshold. 
 Junior enlisted with few years of service are not compensated enough to 
meet society’s standard for poverty.  Next, we compared the current medical 
retirement system to the VSL model in order to determine if the current model is 
equitable.  Table 3 displays the NPVs for both models.  
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Table 3. NPV Comparison of Current and VSL Models 
100 
Percent 
Disability 
Average 
Age 
Number 
of Cash 
Flows 
 Yearly 
Payments--
Current  
 NPV--
Current  
 Yearly 
Payments--
VSL   NPV--VSL  
Difference 
(%) 
E1 20 50 
            
16,794.00  
       
839,700.00  
     
19,980.02  
   
1,000,000.00  -16.0% 
E2 20 50 
            
18,824.40  
       
941,220.00  
     
21,059.05  
   
1,054,005.58  -10.7% 
E3 22 48 
            
21,891.60  
   
1,050,796.80  
     
22,066.86  
   
1,066,932.45  -1.5% 
E4 24 47 
            
24,294.00  
   
1,141,818.00  
     
23,556.65  
   
1,100,095.46  3.8% 
E5 28 43 
            
27,846.00  
   
1,197,378.00  
     
28,652.90  
   
1,243,535.82  -3.7% 
O1 25 46 
            
32,296.80  
   
1,485,652.80  
     
30,552.42  
   
1,400,828.68  6.1% 
E6 35 38 
            
33,546.00  
   
1,274,748.00  
     
38,293.46  
   
1,445,577.99  -11.8% 
O2 27 44 
            
35,178.00  
   
1,547,832.00  
     
33,687.48  
   
1,488,986.73  4.0% 
E7 40 34 
            
41,610.00  
   
1,414,740.00  
     
49,260.19  
   
1,660,068.26  -14.8% 
E8 43 31 
            
48,588.00  
   
1,506,228.00  
     
58,967.17  
   
1,845,672.55  -18.4% 
O3 32 40 
            
48,877.20  
   
1,955,088.00  
     
46,161.02  
   
1,853,364.84  5.5% 
E9 45 30 
            
58,741.20  
   
1,762,236.00  
     
71,236.78  
   
2,115,732.40  -16.7% 
O4 38 35 
            
65,678.40  
   
2,298,744.00  
     
65,070.76  
   
2,300,251.48  -0.1% 
O5 43 31 
            
71,115.60  
   
2,204,583.60  
     
78,110.95  
   
2,444,872.81  -9.8% 
O6 48 27 
            
96,270.00  
   
2,599,290.00  
   
114,483.16  
   
3,113,942.00  -16.5% 
   
We observe a difference in the societal standard for a disability and the current 
compensation given to service-members.  This disparity is prevalent amongst the 
very junior enlisted ranks as well as the senior enlisted and officer ranks.  Table 4 
displays the sensitivity in the difference between models due to shorter life span 
as well as the average difference between the VSL and current models for all 
disability retirement ratings  
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Table 4. Variations in Life-Span and the Average Difference in NPV between 
VSL & Current Models Across VASRD 
 
Rank 
100 Percent 
Disability 
100 
Percent 
Disability 
5% Fewer 
Cash-flows 
100 
Percent 
Disability 
10% Fewer 
Cash-flows 
Average 
Difference 
Between 
Models for All 
VASRD 
E1 -16.0% -19.4% -24.4% -16.0% 
E2 -10.7% -14.3% -19.6% -10.7% 
E3 -1.5% -5.6% -11.8% -1.5% 
E4 3.8% -0.6% -7.2% 3.8% 
E5 -3.7% -8.2% -12.7% -3.7% 
O1 6.1% 1.4% -5.5% 6.1% 
E6 -11.8% -16.5% -21.1% -11.8% 
O2 4.0% -0.8% -5.5% 4.0% 
E7 -14.8% -19.8% -22.3% -11.2% 
E8 -18.4% -23.7% -26.3% -10.5% 
O3 5.5% 0.2% -5.1% 5.5% 
E9 -16.7% -19.5% -25.0% -8.7% 
O4 -0.1% -5.8% -8.6% -0.1% 
O5 -9.8% -15.6% -18.6% -7.9% 
O6 -16.5% -19.6% -25.8% -13.7% 
 
Our computations for the number of cash-flows are composed of the average life-
span for disabled veterans; therefore, the number of cash-flows is a ceiling for 
our computations.  However, we can assume higher ratings of disabilities can 
decrease the average life-span.  Testing this assumption we see the discrepancy 
between the models grows wider with as the life-span decreases.  Figure 9 
displays the delta between the two systems per rank per disability rating.   
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Figure 9.  Percentage Difference in NPV Between Models 
A negative delta represents compensation below the VSL.  Junior officers and 
E4s have positive deltas representing overcompensation compared to the VSL.  
The three sharp peaks in Figure 4.6 representing E8, E9, and O6 at the 30 
percent disability show large overcompensation compared to the VSL.  These 
three points embody less than one-half of one percent of cases for newly 
disabled veterans.  In Figure 4.6 we also notice the delta does not vary much per 
each rank from 40 to 100 percent disability.  This lack of variation is due to the 
calculation of the current system.  The disability percentage multiplied by the 
High-3 becomes the higher of the two calculations for the current system at 
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ratings of 40 percent and above; therefore, the compensation percentage for any 
disability rating higher than 40 percent moves in unison with the VSL model.    
We have identified inconsistencies between the current model and the 
societal standard for equitable compensation.  Junior enlisted members, E5 and 
below, with few years of service represents 61.4 percent of all newly disabled 
veterans, and these are the same service-members who are disproportionately 
affected by the current medical retirement system.  A more equitable means of 
calculating medical retirement pay is the VSL model which takes into account the 
value society has placed on the injury or disease. 
The cost to implement the VSL would increase the budget for newly 
medically retired service-members approximately $1.17 million per year for all 
DoD.  This assumes disability ratings remain constant.   If the VSL model applied 
retroactively to all medically retirees the cost for all DoD would increase by $176 
million.   
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V.  Summary and Conclusion 
 The goal of this research was to scrutinize the 60 year old method for 
calculating compensation for medical military retirement.  Our research proposed 
the VSL model as the equitable measure for valuing disability compensation 
because it incorporates society’s value of compensation per injury or disease.  
The comparison of the current system to the VSL model shows a pay 
discrepancy for junior enlisted service-members with few years in service.  The 
current system places these junior enlisted members into or just above poverty.  
The VSL model corrects the inadequacies in pay; moreover, the VSL model can 
easily be updated from year-to-year to account for changes in society’s value of 
injury or illness.  The VSL model is the minimum standard for compensating our 
disabled veterans.  The costs to implement this model increase the DoD budget 
by $176 million per year.   
Limitations 
One limitation in this research is the lack of knowledge of how disability 
ratings affect life-span.  Our calculations for the number of cash-flows a service-
member receives are based on the average life-span for disabled service-
members.  We showed in Table 4.4 the discrepancy in pay between the two 
systems increased as average life-span decreased. 
Future Research 
Future research could be done on the affects of disabilities on life-span.  
Those results could enhance the VSL model by having a more precise 
calculation for yearly cash-flows.  We would also like to see future research 
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testing inconsistencies in disability ratings between officers and enlisted as well 
as differences between disability ratings between services.  The results would 
further ensure equity compensation to our disabled veterans. 
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Appendix A.  Comparisons of Two Models per Disability Rating 
 
Table 5.  NPV Comparison of Current and VSL Models 30% Disability 
Rank 
Average 
Age 
Number 
of Cash 
Flows 
 Yearly 
Payments--
Current  
 NPV--
Current  
 Yearly 
Payments--
VSL   NPV--VSL  
Difference 
(%) 
E1 20 50 
               
5,038.20  
       
251,910.00  
       
6,000.00  
       
300,000.00  -16.0% 
E2 20 50 
               
5,647.32  
       
282,366.00  
       
6,324.03  
       
316,201.68  -10.7% 
E3 22 48 
               
6,567.48  
       
315,239.04  
       
6,668.33  
       
320,079.74  -1.5% 
E4 24 47 
               
7,288.20  
       
342,545.40  
       
7,021.89  
       
330,028.64  3.8% 
E5 28 43 
               
8,353.80  
       
359,213.40  
       
8,675.83  
       
373,060.75  -3.7% 
O1 25 46 
               
9,689.04  
       
445,695.84  
       
9,135.84  
       
420,248.60  6.1% 
E6 35 38 
            
10,063.80  
       
382,424.40  
     
11,412.46  
       
433,673.40  -11.8% 
O2 27 44 
            
10,553.40  
       
464,349.60  
     
10,152.18  
       
446,696.02  4.0% 
E7 40 34 
            
16,644.00  
       
565,896.00  
     
14,647.66  
       
498,020.48  13.6% 
E8 43 31 
            
23,079.30  
       
715,458.30  
     
17,861.35  
       
553,701.77  29.2% 
O3 32 40 
            
14,663.16  
       
586,526.40  
     
13,900.24  
       
556,009.45  5.5% 
E9 45 30 
            
27,902.07  
       
837,062.10  
     
21,157.32  
       
634,719.72  31.9% 
O4 38 35 
            
19,703.52  
       
689,623.20  
     
19,716.44  
       
690,075.44  -0.1% 
O5 43 31 
            
24,890.46  
       
771,604.26  
     
23,660.06  
       
733,461.84  5.2% 
O6 48 27 
            
41,336.46  
   
1,116,084.42  
     
34,599.36  
       
934,182.60  19.5% 
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Table 6.  NPV Comparison of Current and VSL Models 40% Disability 
Rank 
Average 
Age 
Number 
of Cash 
Flows 
 Yearly 
Payments--
Current  
 NPV--
Current  
 Yearly 
Payments--
VSL   NPV--VSL  
Difference 
(%) 
E1 20 50 
               
6,717.60  
       
335,880.00  
       
8,000.00  
       
400,000.00  -16.0% 
E2 20 50 
               
7,529.76  
       
376,488.00  
       
8,432.04  
       
421,602.23  -10.7% 
E3 22 48 
               
8,756.64  
       
420,318.72  
       
8,891.10  
       
426,772.98  -1.5% 
E4 24 47 
               
9,717.60  
       
456,727.20  
       
9,362.51  
       
440,038.18  3.8% 
E5 28 43 
            
11,138.40  
       
478,951.20  
     
11,567.78  
       
497,414.33  -3.7% 
O1 25 46 
            
12,918.72  
       
594,261.12  
     
12,181.12  
       
560,331.47  6.1% 
E6 35 38 
            
13,418.40  
       
509,899.20  
     
15,216.61  
       
578,231.20  -11.8% 
O2 27 44 
            
14,071.20  
       
619,132.80  
     
13,536.24  
       
595,594.69  4.0% 
E7 40 34 
            
16,644.00  
       
565,896.00  
     
19,530.21  
       
664,027.30  -14.8% 
E8 43 31 
            
23,079.30  
       
715,458.30  
     
23,815.13  
       
738,269.02  -3.1% 
O3 32 40 
            
19,550.88  
       
782,035.20  
     
18,533.65  
       
741,345.94  5.5% 
E9 45 30 
            
27,902.07  
       
837,062.10  
     
28,209.77  
       
846,292.96  -1.1% 
O4 38 35 
            
26,271.36  
       
919,497.60  
     
26,288.59  
       
920,100.59  -0.1% 
O5 43 31 
            
28,446.24  
       
881,833.44  
     
31,546.75  
       
977,949.13  -9.8% 
O6 48 27 
            
41,336.46  
   
1,116,084.42  
     
46,132.47  
   
1,245,576.80  -10.4% 
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Table 7.  NPV Comparison of Current and VSL Models 50% Disability 
Rank 
Average 
Age 
Number 
of Cash 
Flows 
 Yearly 
Payments--
Current  
 NPV--
Current  
 Yearly 
Payments--
VSL   NPV--VSL  
Difference 
(%) 
E1 20 50 
               
8,397.00  
       
419,850.00  
     
10,000.00  
       
500,000.00  -16.0% 
E2 20 50 
               
9,412.20  
       
470,610.00  
     
10,540.06  
       
527,002.79  -10.7% 
E3 22 48 
            
10,945.80  
       
525,398.40  
     
11,113.88  
       
533,466.23  -1.5% 
E4 24 47 
            
12,147.00  
       
570,909.00  
     
11,703.14  
       
550,047.73  3.8% 
E5 28 43 
            
13,923.00  
       
598,689.00  
     
14,459.72  
       
621,767.91  -3.7% 
O1 25 46 
            
16,148.40  
       
742,826.40  
     
15,226.40  
       
700,414.34  6.1% 
E6 35 38 
            
16,773.00  
       
637,374.00  
     
19,020.76  
       
722,789.00  -11.8% 
O2 27 44 
            
17,589.00  
       
773,916.00  
     
16,920.30  
       
744,493.37  4.0% 
E7 40 34 
            
20,805.00  
       
707,370.00  
     
24,412.77  
       
830,034.13  -14.8% 
E8 43 31 
            
24,294.00  
       
753,114.00  
     
29,768.91  
       
922,836.28  -18.4% 
O3 32 40 
            
24,438.60  
       
977,544.00  
     
23,167.06  
       
926,682.42  5.5% 
E9 45 30 
            
29,370.60  
       
881,118.00  
     
35,262.21  
   
1,057,866.20  -16.7% 
O4 38 35 
            
32,839.20  
   
1,149,372.00  
     
32,860.74  
   
1,150,125.74  -0.1% 
O5 43 31 
            
35,557.80  
   
1,102,291.80  
     
39,433.43  
   
1,222,436.41  -9.8% 
O6 48 27 
            
45,929.40  
   
1,240,093.80  
     
57,665.59  
   
1,556,971.00  -20.4% 
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Table 8.  NPV Comparison of Current and VSL Models 60% Disability 
Rank 
Average 
Age 
Number 
of Cash 
Flows 
 Yearly 
Payments--
Current  
 NPV--
Current  
 Yearly 
Payments--
VSL   NPV--VSL  
Difference 
(%) 
E1 20 50 
            
10,076.40  
       
503,820.00  
     
12,000.00  
       
600,000.00  -16.0% 
E2 20 50 
            
11,294.64  
       
564,732.00  
     
12,648.07  
       
632,403.35  -10.7% 
E3 22 48 
            
13,134.96  
       
630,478.08  
     
13,336.66  
       
640,159.47  -1.5% 
E4 24 47 
            
14,576.40  
       
685,090.80  
     
14,043.77  
       
660,057.27  3.8% 
E5 28 43 
            
16,707.60  
       
718,426.80  
     
17,351.66  
       
746,121.49  -3.7% 
O1 25 46 
            
19,378.08  
       
891,391.68  
     
18,271.68  
       
840,497.21  6.1% 
E6 35 38 
            
20,127.60  
       
764,848.80  
     
22,824.92  
       
867,346.79  -11.8% 
O2 27 44 
            
21,106.80  
       
928,699.20  
     
20,304.36  
       
893,392.04  4.0% 
E7 40 34 
            
24,966.00  
       
848,844.00  
     
29,295.32  
       
996,040.95  -14.8% 
E8 43 31 
            
29,152.80  
       
903,736.80  
     
35,722.69  
   
1,107,403.53  -18.4% 
O3 32 40 
            
29,326.32  
   
1,173,052.80  
     
27,800.47  
   
1,112,018.90  5.5% 
E9 45 30 
            
35,244.72  
   
1,057,341.60  
     
42,314.65  
   
1,269,439.44  -16.7% 
O4 38 35 
            
39,407.04  
   
1,379,246.40  
     
39,432.88  
   
1,380,150.89  -0.1% 
O5 43 31 
            
42,669.36  
   
1,322,750.16  
     
47,320.12  
   
1,466,923.69  -9.8% 
O6 48 27 
            
55,115.28  
   
1,488,112.56  
     
69,198.71  
   
1,868,365.20  -20.4% 
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Table 9.  NPV Comparison of Current and VSL Models 70% Disability 
Rank 
Average 
Age 
Number 
of Cash 
Flows 
 Yearly 
Payments--
Current  
 NPV--
Current  
 Yearly 
Payments--
VSL   NPV--VSL  
Difference 
(%) 
E1 20 50 
            
11,755.80  
       
587,790.00  
     
14,000.00  
       
700,000.00  -16.0% 
E2 20 50 
            
13,177.08  
       
658,854.00  
     
14,756.08  
       
737,803.91  -10.7% 
E3 22 48 
            
15,324.12  
       
735,557.76  
     
15,559.43  
       
746,852.72  -1.5% 
E4 24 47 
            
17,005.80  
       
799,272.60  
     
16,384.40  
       
770,066.82  3.8% 
E5 28 43 
            
19,492.20  
       
838,164.60  
     
20,243.61  
       
870,475.08  -3.7% 
O1 25 46 
            
22,607.76  
   
1,039,956.96  
     
21,316.96  
       
980,580.08  6.1% 
E6 35 38 
            
23,482.20  
       
892,323.60  
     
26,629.07  
   
1,011,904.59  -11.8% 
O2 27 44 
            
24,624.60  
   
1,083,482.40  
     
23,688.43  
   
1,042,290.71  4.0% 
E7 40 34 
            
29,127.00  
       
990,318.00  
     
34,177.88  
   
1,162,047.78  -14.8% 
E8 43 31 
            
34,011.60  
   
1,054,359.60  
     
41,676.48  
   
1,291,970.79  -18.4% 
O3 32 40 
            
34,214.04  
   
1,368,561.60  
     
32,433.88  
   
1,297,355.39  5.5% 
E9 45 30 
            
41,118.84  
   
1,233,565.20  
     
49,367.09  
   
1,481,012.68  -16.7% 
O4 38 35 
            
45,974.88  
   
1,609,120.80  
     
46,005.03  
   
1,610,176.03  -0.1% 
O5 43 31 
            
49,780.92  
   
1,543,208.52  
     
55,206.81  
   
1,711,410.97  -9.8% 
O6 48 27 
            
64,301.16  
   
1,736,131.32  
     
80,731.83  
   
2,179,759.40  -20.4% 
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Table 10.  NPV Comparison of Current and VSL Models 80% Disability  
Rank 
Average 
Age 
Number 
of Cash 
Flows 
 Yearly 
Payments--
Current  
 NPV--
Current  
 Yearly 
Payments--
VSL   NPV--VSL  
Difference 
(%) 
E1 20 50 
            
13,435.20  
       
671,760.00  
     
16,000.00  
       
800,000.00  -16.0% 
E2 20 50 
            
15,059.52  
       
752,976.00  
     
16,864.09  
       
843,204.47  -10.7% 
E3 22 48 
            
17,513.28  
       
840,637.44  
     
17,782.21  
       
853,545.96  -1.5% 
E4 24 47 
            
19,435.20  
       
913,454.40  
     
18,725.03  
       
880,076.37  3.8% 
E5 28 43 
            
22,276.80  
       
957,902.40  
     
23,135.55  
       
994,828.66  -3.7% 
O1 25 46 
            
25,837.44  
   
1,188,522.24  
     
24,362.24  
   
1,120,662.95  6.1% 
E6 35 38 
            
26,836.80  
   
1,019,798.40  
     
30,433.22  
   
1,156,462.39  -11.8% 
O2 27 44 
            
28,142.40  
   
1,238,265.60  
     
27,072.49  
   
1,191,189.39  4.0% 
E7 40 34 
            
33,288.00  
   
1,131,792.00  
     
39,060.43  
   
1,328,054.60  -14.8% 
E8 43 31 
            
38,870.40  
   
1,204,982.40  
     
47,630.26  
   
1,476,538.04  -18.4% 
O3 32 40 
            
39,101.76  
   
1,564,070.40  
     
37,067.30  
   
1,482,691.87  5.5% 
E9 45 30 
            
46,992.96  
   
1,409,788.80  
     
56,419.53  
   
1,692,585.92  -16.7% 
O4 38 35 
            
52,542.72  
   
1,838,995.20  
     
52,577.18  
   
1,840,201.18  -0.1% 
O5 43 31 
            
56,892.48  
   
1,763,666.88  
     
63,093.49  
   
1,955,898.25  -9.8% 
O6 48 27 
            
73,487.04  
   
1,984,150.08  
     
92,264.95  
   
2,491,153.60  -20.4% 
 
  
47 
 
Table 11.  NPV Comparison of Current and VSL Models 90% Disability  
Rank 
Average 
Age 
Number 
of Cash 
Flows 
 Yearly 
Payments--
Current  
 NPV--
Current  
 Yearly 
Payments--
VSL   NPV--VSL  
Difference 
(%) 
E1 20 50 
            
15,114.60  
       
755,730.00  
     
18,000.00  
       
900,000.00  -16.0% 
E2 20 50 
            
16,941.96  
       
847,098.00  
     
18,972.10  
       
948,605.03  -10.7% 
E3 22 48 
            
19,702.44  
       
945,717.12  
     
20,004.98  
       
960,239.21  -1.5% 
E4 24 47 
            
21,864.60  
   
1,027,636.20  
     
21,065.66  
       
990,085.91  3.8% 
E5 28 43 
            
25,061.40  
   
1,077,640.20  
     
26,027.49  
   
1,119,182.24  -3.7% 
O1 25 46 
            
29,067.12  
   
1,337,087.52  
     
27,407.52  
   
1,260,745.81  6.1% 
E6 35 38 
            
30,191.40  
   
1,147,273.20  
     
34,237.37  
   
1,301,020.19  -11.8% 
O2 27 44 
            
31,660.20  
   
1,393,048.80  
     
30,456.55  
   
1,340,088.06  4.0% 
E7 40 34 
            
37,449.00  
   
1,273,266.00  
     
43,942.98  
   
1,494,061.43  -14.8% 
E8 43 31 
            
43,729.20  
   
1,355,605.20  
     
53,584.04  
   
1,661,105.30  -18.4% 
O3 32 40 
            
43,989.48  
   
1,759,579.20  
     
41,700.71  
   
1,668,028.36  5.5% 
E9 45 30 
            
52,867.08  
   
1,586,012.40  
     
63,471.97  
   
1,904,159.16  -16.7% 
O4 38 35 
            
59,110.56  
   
2,068,869.60  
     
59,149.32  
   
2,070,226.33  -0.1% 
O5 43 31 
            
64,004.04  
   
1,984,125.24  
     
70,980.18  
   
2,200,385.53  -9.8% 
O6 48 27 
            
82,672.92  
   
2,232,168.84  
   
103,798.07  
   
2,802,547.80  -20.4% 
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Table 12.  NPV Comparison of Current and VSL Models 100% Disability  
Rank 
Average 
Age 
Number 
of Cash 
Flows 
 Yearly 
Payments--
Current  
 NPV--
Current  
 Yearly 
Payments--
VSL   NPV--VSL  
Difference 
(%) 
E1 20 50 
            
16,794.00  
       
839,700.00  
     
19,980.02  
   
1,000,000.00  -16.0% 
E2 20 50 
            
18,824.40  
       
941,220.00  
     
21,059.05  
   
1,054,005.58  -10.7% 
E3 22 48 
            
21,891.60  
   
1,050,796.80  
     
22,066.86  
   
1,066,932.45  -1.5% 
E4 24 47 
            
24,294.00  
   
1,141,818.00  
     
23,556.65  
   
1,100,095.46  3.8% 
E5 28 43 
            
27,846.00  
   
1,197,378.00  
     
28,652.90  
   
1,243,535.82  -3.7% 
O1 25 46 
            
32,296.80  
   
1,485,652.80  
     
30,552.42  
   
1,400,828.68  6.1% 
E6 35 38 
            
33,546.00  
   
1,274,748.00  
     
38,293.46  
   
1,445,577.99  -11.8% 
O2 27 44 
            
35,178.00  
   
1,547,832.00  
     
33,687.48  
   
1,488,986.73  4.0% 
E7 40 34 
            
41,610.00  
   
1,414,740.00  
     
49,260.19  
   
1,660,068.26  -14.8% 
E8 43 31 
            
48,588.00  
   
1,506,228.00  
     
58,967.17  
   
1,845,672.55  -18.4% 
O3 32 40 
            
48,877.20  
   
1,955,088.00  
     
46,161.02  
   
1,853,364.84  5.5% 
E9 45 30 
            
58,741.20  
   
1,762,236.00  
     
71,236.78  
   
2,115,732.40  -16.7% 
O4 38 35 
            
65,678.40  
   
2,298,744.00  
     
65,070.76  
   
2,300,251.48  -0.1% 
O5 43 31 
            
71,115.60  
   
2,204,583.60  
     
78,110.95  
   
2,444,872.81  -9.8% 
O6 48 27 
            
96,270.00  
   
2,599,290.00  
   
114,483.16  
   
3,113,942.00  -16.5% 
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